



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



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AN APPEAL TO BRITISH FAIR PLAY



*aid of
Royal Inst. Internat. Affairs.*





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AN APPEAL
TO BRITISH
FAIR PLAY

An Appeal To British Fair Play

Germany's alleged sole responsibility for the World War is the explicit basis of the Treaty of Versailles.

Every sensible German admits that his former Government, upon different occasions, by grave mistakes, by provocation, by bluff, through lack of psychological understanding, by blustering demeanour and so forth contributed to a considerable extent in producing the conditions from which the catastrophe of 1914 arose. No European Government can declare itself innocent in this respect.

But the charge made by the Allies in the Ultimatum of June 16, 1919, in the accompanying note of Mr. Clemenceau, the President of the Peace Conference, and in Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles is:

that Germany alone among the nations was prepared for a great war;

that Germany, the only disturber of peace for decades, had prepared a war of aggression and conquest;

that Germany had deliberately unchained this war in 1914 in order to obtain "predominance in Europe", and to carry out her "plans for universal domination"; —

whereas the Allies only desired "to preserve their liberty".

We firmly contend that this verdict is, in its gross partiality, untrue. Yet the Treaty of Versailles, a punitive peace

almost unparalleled in history, which continuously poisons the life of the European Peoples and contains numerous germs of new wars, is admittedly based upon it.

The Allies had repeatedly and solemnly promised Germany a "just Peace". The basis for it was bindingly agreed upon from Government to Government before the Armistice of 1918. In Germany, the radical change took place which the Allies had recommended. The broad masses of the German people counted upon the word of the Entente. Germany's disarmament was to have been the prelude to a general disarmament. With the League of Nations, it was said, an era of Universal Justice and real World Peace would be inaugurated.

But Germany, from the Armistice until now, has been made to feel that owing to the charge of sole culpability for the war, she is placed on a different footing to all other States. Her protests against obvious illegalities and injustices have been invariably met, in the last resort, by insistence upon this charge against which she has never been given the opportunity of defending herself before the world.


The vast majority of the German people sincerely desire peace. They are ready to accept the consequences of the lost war and to assume burdens which present-day Germany is able to fulfill according to the judgement of international experts. But how can peaceful inspirations guide the soul of a great nation which passionately believes itself traduced in the moral sphere; and which knows itself to be suffering primarily as the result of what it most firmly contends to be an historical untruth?

The German people unanimously repudiate the moral stigma of a criminal nation which in 1919 they were forced


under duress to admit, and the German people will not rest until this moral stigma which made the German nation a pariah has been removed by a just and impartial verdict as the result of an investigation by impartial judges. For no nation can rest indifferent to an unjust imputation upon its honour.

The British people are, more than any other, in a position to check the anarchy and chaos of Europe. The fundamental condition for a sane reconstruction of European affairs is Justice to Germany. This is impossible without a thorough investigation of the causes of the war and a re-examination of the charge of sole guilt brought against Germany. We appeal therefore to the sense of Justice, to the sense of Fair Play, to the Common Sense of the British People, and we ask that the following short digest of the historical development of Europe from 1870 to 1914 together with the documents quoted therein, may be carefully studied.


The signatures affixed below of leading Germans of all parties, classes and professions testify to the unanimity of the German people in a struggle for their honour, which is a struggle for elementary justice and of deep importance to all the Peoples of Europe.



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¹ For names and descriptions of the signers see pp. 21—30.

Dr. Bergstrüper

4

J. Bernstorff.

5

August Bleier

6

Wilhelm Plos

7

Dr. Meyer

8

Muysch Broers

9

Brandenburg

10

Dr. Löffel

11

Carl Brinkmann

12

Heinrich Cunow

13

D. Prof. Reissman,

14

A. Bernburg

15

Wichelm Tibelius.

16

Dr. P. Divv.

17

Hans Härm

18

Trize Eberts

19

Went

20

Onst. G. Malin

21

Malinberg

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Fried. Felger

23

Anton Fendrich

24

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25

Margarete Särker

26

D. Gradnauer

27

H. Grossmann.

28

29




30

Dr. A. O. Zimmerman

Heinrich von Heimbach

33

Dr. Wilhelm Hansenstein

35
 36
 37

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37

Martin Kolbman

V. Nigeln Junger
39

Dr. Robert Hoeniger
40

Ricard Ruck
41

Hermann Wimmel
42

Prof. L. Stätk
43

Dr. Ludwig Kees
44

Sprachunterricht
45

Thaller
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L. Köpfer
47

Dr. Lenz
48

Krüger
49

Fritz Kummer

50

Robert Linnert

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Kugeler-Lerchenfeld

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Freiherr von Lersner

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Jean In Jann

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Kugo Liermann

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Paul Lübe

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Hermann Luz

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Dr. Werner Markholz

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Bernardina

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Ab Müller Prof. Paul Buch

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Müller Kistack. Kistack

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Paul Oestreich

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Hermann Ocken

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Dr. Ernst Oke Jacoby

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Ursay

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Dr. Robert Boll

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V. Houtalein

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Wingshead Thudde

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Richie Anson Beckley

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80

Dr. Fred Robbing.

81

Lawson Jonting

82

Henry Paenger.

83

Alie Lawson

84

Quintus Herman Thack

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85

Schützmann

87

J. M. M. M.

88

H. Schnee

89

Karl von Scholtz

90

Präsident Dr. Jakob Pjorall

91

Freih. von Schou

92

Dr. Georg Schreiber

93

V. Sjöberg

94

Schulze Gavernitz

95

Thassagay

96

Hegmont-honny

97

Hiener

98

J. W. Simons

99

H. L. L.

100

D. Fischer

101

Dr. phil. Julius Stöcker

102

Dr. Nagel. Kump

103

104

Wang u. Buch

105

Dr. H. H. Hügnagel

106

Dr. Albert Lidekum. Fug Tannow

107

108

Dr. H. H. Finare Nieldje

109

110

H. Finare

111

Andreas Finare.

112

Carl Ulitzky

113

Veit Valentini

114

J. M. Verweyen

115

Ernst Vajtkinder

116

Paul Wissell

117

Paul Wolff

118

D. J. Zennack

119

Prof. Zorn.

120

Names and Descriptions of the Signers

1. Erhard Auer, Munich; form. Bavarian Minister for Home Affairs; Member of the Bav. Diet, Socialdemocrat; Chief Editor of the *Münchener Post*.
2. Erwin Barth, Berlin; Editor; President of the Union *Arbeiterpresse* (Labour Press); Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.
3. D. Otto Baumgarten, Professor in ord. of Practical Theology at the University of Kiel; in October 1922 invited Member of the International Conference for the Rehabilitation of the Moral Ideal, London; Member of the Democratic Party.
4. Dr. Ludwig Bergsträsser, Professor of History at the Technical University of Berlin; Chief Recorder at the German Federal Archives; Author of *Die Diplomatischen Kämpfe vor Kriegsausbruch* (The Diplomatic Struggle before the Outbreak of the War), *Geschichte der Politischen Parteien in Deutschland* (History of the Political Parties in Germany) etc.; Member of the Reichstag, Democrat.
5. Count J. H. von Bernstorff, Starnberg; German Ambassador at Washington from 1908 to 1917; President of the German League of Nations' Union; Vice-President of the Federation of Societies for the League of Nations; Member of the Reichstag and its Committee for Foreign Affairs, Democrat.
6. August Bleier, Clergyman in Charlottenburg; President of the *Vereinigung der Freunde von Religion und Völkerfrieden* (Society of Friends of Religion and Universal Peace); Member of the Executive Committee of the German Peace Society and of the Socialdemocratic Party.
7. Wilhelm Blos, Stuttgart; form. President of the State of Württemberg; for many years Member of the Reichstag, Socialdemocrat.
8. Dr. M. J. Bonn, Professor of Political Science at the Commercial Academy of Berlin.
9. Dr. ing. h. c. Robert Bosch, Stuttgart; Founder and President of the Bosch Magneto Company; Member of the German Federal Economic Council and of the Democratic Party.
10. Dr. Erich Brandenburg, Professor of Modern History at the University of Leipzig; Author of *Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege* (From Bismarck to the World War).

11. Dr. Brecht, Berlin; Head of a Department in the German Home Office.
12. Carl Brinkmann, Professor in ord. of Political Science at the University of Heidelberg.
13. Heinrich Cunow, Professor of Sociology and Economic History at the University of Berlin; form. Director of the Ethnological Museum in Berlin; Member of the Prussian Diet, Socialdemocrat.
14. D. Adolf Deissmann, Professor of Theology at the University of Berlin; Geheimer Konsistorialrat (Ecclesiastical Privy Councillor); Member of the General Synod.
15. Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, Berlin; form. Secretary for the Colonies, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Member of the Prussian House of Lords; Vice-President of the German League of Nations' Union; since 1919 Member of the Reichstag, Democrat.
16. Dr. Wilhelm Dibelius, Professor of English at the University of Bonn; Member of the German National People's Party.
17. Dr. P. Dirr, Director of the City Archives of Munich; Editor of *Bayerische Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch* (Bavarian Documents concerning the Outbreak of the War; 2nd ed. 1924), and Author of other writings on the War Guilt Question; Member of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party, District of Bavaria.
18. Hans Draeger, Berlin; Secretary General of the *Arbeitsausschuß deutscher Verbände*; Editor of the *Außenpolitische Rundbriefe der deutschen Jugend* (Circulars on Foreign Politics for the German Youth).
19. Fritz Ebert jun., Berlin; Editor; Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.
20. Dr. Christian Eckert, Professor of Political Science at the University of Cologne; Privy Councillor.
21. Anton Erkelenz, Berlin; President of the *Gewerkschaftsring der Arbeiter-, Angestellten- und Beamtenverbände* (Federation of Trade Unions of Workmen, Employees and Officials); Member of the Reichstag, Democrat.
22. Albert Falkenberg, Berlin; form. Privy Councillor; President of the General Officials' Union; Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.
23. Friedrich Felger, Director of the *Weltkriegsbücherei* (World War Library), Stuttgart-Berg.
24. Anton Fendrich, Friburg (Baden), Writer; works for the Conciliation of all Christian Creeds; on Principle opposed to any Revenge; Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.

25. Dr. Fritz Foth, Lord Lieutenant and Sheriff (Landrat) of Mecklenburg-Strelitz; Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.
26. Margarete Gärtner, Manager of the *Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft*, Berlin.
27. Dr. Gradnauer, Berlin; form. German Minister for Home Affairs; at present Minister of Saxony to the German Central Government and to Prussia; Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.
28. Peter Grassmann, Berlin; President of the *Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (General Trade Union); Member of the German Federal Economic Council and of the Reichstag, Socialdemocrat.
29. Arthur von Gwinner, Member of the Board of the Deutsche Bank, Berlin.
30. Dr. Konrad Haenisch, President of the District of Wiesbaden; from 1918 to 1921 Prussian Minister of Public Instruction; President of the *Republikanische Reichsbund* (Associated Republican Unions); Member of the Prussian Diet, Socialdemocrat.
31. Dr. Otto Hammann, Berlin; Director of the Press Department of the German Foreign Office from 1894 to 1915; Author of *Der Neue Kurs, Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges, Um den Kaiser, Der mißverständne Bismarck, Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit*.
32. Haniel von Haimhausen, Munich; Minister of the Federal Government to Bavaria; form. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
33. Dr. Hans Adolf Harder, Berlin; Secretary General of the German League of Nations' Union.
34. Dr. phil. Wilhelm Hausenstein, Munich; Author.
35. Professor Dr. Hans F. Helmolt, Berlin; Historian and Publicist; Author of *Kautsky der Historiker* (Kautsky the Historian, 1920), *Von Caprivi bis Versailles. Ein Leitfaden in der Schuldfrage* (From Caprivi to Versailles. A Manual of the War Guilt Question, 1923) and other books; Partisan of the German National People's Party.
36. Ludwig Herz, LL. D., Judge of the Lower Court in Berlin; form. Secretary General of the Parliamentary Investigating Committee of the Reichstag regarding the War; Member of the Democratic Party.
37. Dr. Johannes Hieber, Stuttgart; form. President of the State of Württemberg and Minister of Public Worship; Member of the Diet of Württ., Democrat.
38. Dr. Martin Hobohm, Assistant Professor of Medieval and Modern History at the University of Berlin; Recorder at the German Federal Archives; Author of the official Memoir *Die alldeutsche Bewegung*,

- eine politische Schuld und Gefahr*, presented to the Imperial Chancellor in March 1916; in Collaboration with Paul Rohrbach and Joachim Kühn Author of *Chauvinismus und Weltkrieg*, vol. II: *Die Alldutschen* (The German Jingoës); Member of the Democratic Party.
39. Dr. Wilhelm Hoegner, Munich; Staatsanwalt (Public Prosecutor); President of the General Officials' Union, District of Bavaria; Member of the Bavarian Diet, Socialdemocrat.
 40. Dr. Robert Hoeniger, Hon. Professor at the University of Berlin; Expert of the Parliamentary Investigating Committee of the Reichstag regarding the War; Author of *Russlands Vorbereitung zum Weltkrieg* (Russia's Preparation for the World War).
 41. Dr. phil. Ricarda Huch, Munich; Authoress.
 42. Professor Dr.-Ing. Hermann Hummel, Heidelberg; form. President of the State of Baden and Minister of Public Worship and Education; Member of the Democratic Party.
 43. Professor Dr. E. Jäckh, Berlin; President of the Executive Committee of the German League of Nations' Union; Expert of the Parliamentary Investigating Committee of the Reichstag regarding the War.
 44. Dr. Ludwig Kaas, Professor of Canonical Law in Trier; Päpstlicher Hausprälat and Domkapitular (Prelate of the Papal Household and Canon); Member of the Prussian State Council; Member of the Reichstag and its Foreign Committee, Centre.
 45. Dr. phil. et Dr. ing. h. c. Georg Kerschensteiner; Professor h. c. at the University of Munich; Member of the Reichstag 1911—1918, Democrat; Member of the Consultative Education Committee of Bavaria and Superintendent of the Munich Schools.
 46. Count Harry von Keßler, Berlin; form. German Minister to Poland; Member of the Democratic Party.
 47. Dr. C. Köttgen, Berlin; General Manager of Siemens-Schuckertwerke, Ltd.
 48. Monsignore Dr. Kreutz, Berlin; Privy Chamberlain of the Papal Household; President of the *Deutscher Caritasverband* (German Charity Union).
 49. Krüger, Governor of the District of Lüneburg (Regierungspräsident); Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.
 50. Fritz Kummer, Stuttgart; Editor of the *Metallarbeiter-Zeitung*, Official Organ of the German Metal Workers' Union; Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.

51. Robert Leinert, First Mayor of the City of Hanover; President of the Prussian Diet, Socialdemocrat.
52. Count Hugo von Lerchenfeld, Munich; form. Prime Minister of Bavaria; Member of the Reichstag and its Committee for Foreign Affairs, Bav. People's Party.
53. Baron von Lersner, Willmannsdorf; form. President of the German Peace Delegation at Versailles.
54. Pastor Paul Le Seur, Berlin; Superintendent of the Berlin City Mission; Member of the Executive Committee of the World-Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches; Editor of *Der Hochweg* (Monthly for Life and Work).
55. Dr. phil. Hugo Lindemann, Ex-Minister of State; Honorary Professor at the University of Cologne; Director at the Institute of Research for Social Science of the City of Cologne; Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.
56. Paul Löbe, Breslau; Editor; Member of the Prussian State Council; President of the Reichstag from 1920 to 1924; Member of the present Reichstag, Socialdemocrat.
57. Hermann Lutz, Munich; Expert of the Parliamentary Investigating Committee of the Reichstag regarding the War; Member of the Democratic Party.
58. Dr. Werner Mahrholz, Grünberg in Silesia; Editor of the Monthly *Archiv für Politik und Geschichte* (Archive for Politics and History); Member of the Democratic Party.
59. Dr. phil. h. c. Thomas Mann, Munich; Novelist and Essayist (of several works exist English editions); lately guest of the PEN Club, London.
60. Albert Martmöller, Secretary of the German Miners' Union, Bochum i. W.; Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.
61. Ernst Mehlich, Dortmund; Commissioner of the State and Federal Government; Member of the Prussian State Council and of the Socialdemocratic Party.
62. Dr. Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, University of Hamburg; Principal of the German Institute of International Affairs; Editor of the Monthly *Europäische Gespräche*; Co-Editor of the German Official Documents *Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1870—1914*.
63. Dr. Arnold Oskar Meyer, Professor in ord. of Modern and Medieval History at the University of Göttingen; Member of the German National People's Party.

64. Dr. Wolfgang Michael, Professor of Western European History at the University of Friburg (Baden).
65. Professor Dr. Georg Minde-Pouet, Munich; Director of the *Deutsche Bücherei* (German Library) at Leipzig from 1917 to 1924.
66. Hans Moeller, Owner and Director of the *Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte* (German Publishing Company for Politics and History), Berlin.
67. Berta Morena, Munich; Concert and Opera Singer (Wagner).
68. Dr. jur. publ. August Müller, Professor at the University of Berlin, lecturing on Co-operative Movement; form. Undersecretary of State on the Food Distribution Board and German Federal Minister for Economics; Member of the German Federal Economic Council and of the Socialdemocratic Party.
69. Professor Carl Muth, Munich; Editor of "*Hochland*", a Catholic Monthly for Science, Literature and Art.
70. Walther Nithack-Stahn, Berlin; Rector of the *Kaiser Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche*; Member of the German League of Nations' Union and of the German Peace Society; Author of *Das Christusdrama* and other religious and pacifist writings.
71. Professor Paul Oestreich, Berlin; President of the League of Radical School Reformers.
72. Hermann Oncken, Professor in ord. of Modern History at the University of Munich.
73. Dr. Edith Oske-Jacoby, Münster i. W.; form. Head of a Department in the German League of Nations' Union.
74. Dr. jur. Carl Petersen, Lord Mayor of the City, and Prime Minister of the State, of Hamburg; form. Member of the State Tribunal; President of the German Democratic Party and of its Parliamentary Group from 1919 to 1924; Member of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party.
75. Dr. Robert Pohl, Berlin; Head Engineer; Member of the Executive Committee of the German Peace Society.
76. Count Friedrich von Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg from 1907 to 1914; Author of *Am Scheidewege zwischen Krieg und Frieden* (At the Crossways between War and Peace).
77. Dr. Hugo Preuss, Berlin; form. German Federal Minister for Home Affairs; Author of the draft of the Weimar Constitution; Member of the Prussian Diet, Democrat.
78. Professor Dr. Ludwig Quidde, Munich; Historian; President of the *Deutsche Friedenskartell* (Union of 22 Peace Organisations) and

- of the Executive Committee of the German Peace Society; Vice-President of the International Union of Peace Societies; Member of the Executive Committee of the German Democratic Party.
79. Dr. Julius Richter, DD.; Professor of the Science of Missions at the University of Berlin.
 80. Dr. Hans Roeseler, Berlin; Editor of the Monthly *Archiv für Politik und Geschichte* (Archive for Politics and History).
 81. Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Berlin.
 82. Baron G. von Romberg, German Minister at Bern from 1912 to 1919; Editor of *Die Fälschungen des russischen Orangebuches* (English edition: The Falsifications of the Russian Orange Book).
 83. Alwin Saenger, Munich; Barrister; form. Bavarian Secretary of State; Member of the Reichstag, Socialdemocrat.
 84. Dr. phil. Alice Salomon, Berlin; Director of the *Wohlfahrtsschule* (School for Social Work).
 85. Dr. med. Ferdinand Sauerbruch; Privy Councillor; University Professor; Director of the University Surgical Clinic, Munich.
 86. Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, Berlin; President of the Reichsbank; Member of the Democratic Party.
 87. Schlüpmann, Berlin-Lichterfelde; Geheimer Regierungsrat a. D.; Industriedirektor.
 88. Eduard Schmid, Lord Mayor of Munich, Capital of Bavaria; Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.
 89. Dr. jur. et rer. pol. h. c. H. Schnee, Berlin; form. Governor of German East Africa; Author of *Weltpolitik*; Member of the Reichstag, German People's Party.
 90. Karl von Schoch, Munich; Lieutenant-General, retired; President of the German People's Party, District of Bavaria.
 91. D. Jakob Schoell, Prelate, Stuttgart.
 92. Baron von Schoen, Berchtesgaden; German Ambassador at Paris from 1910 to 1914; form. Foreign Secretary; Author of *Erlebtes* (English edition: *The Memoirs of an Ambassador*).
 93. Dr. theol. et phil., Dr. Ing. h. c. Georg Schreiber, Prelate; Professor of Church History at the University of Münster i. W.; Member of the Executive Committee of the German League of Nations' Union; Member of the Reichstag, Centre.
 94. Dr. Walther Schücking, Professor of Law in Berlin; Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague; President of the German Group of the Interparliamentary Union; Co-Editor of *Die*

- Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegausbruch* (The German Documents regarding the Outbreak of the War); Member of the Reichstag, Democrat.
95. Dr. G. von Schulze Gävernitz, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Friburg (Baden); for many years Member of the Reichstag; Writer on the economic and social conditions of England and Russia, and on German banking affairs.
 96. Colonel Bernhard Schwertfeger, retired, Pyrmont; Editor of the Belgian Documents *Zur Europäischen Politik* (Concerning European Politics); Author of *Der Fehlspruch von Versailles* etc.; Expert of the Parliamentary Investigating Committee of the Reichstag regarding the War.
 97. D. Friedrich Siegmund-Schultze, Berlin; Hon. Secretary of the World-Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches; Editor of *Die Eiche*, a Quarterly for Social and International Co-Operation.
 98. Dr. Carl F. von Siemens, Berlin; President of the Board of Directors of the Siemens & Halske Co. and of Siemens-Schuckertwerke, Ltd.; President of the German Federal Economic Council; Member of the Reichstag, Democrat.
 99. Dr. W. Simons, President of the Supreme Court, Leipzig; form. Minister of Foreign Affairs.
 100. Dr. ing. e. h. Kurt Sorge, Berlin; President of the *Reichsverband der Deutschen Industrie*; Member of the *Deutsche Volkspartei*.
 101. Dr. F. A. Spiecker, Berlin; President of the Union of the German Trade-Associations for Workmen's Insurance against Accidents; President of the Berlin Missionary Society; Vice-President of the World-Alliance for Promoting International Friendship through the Churches.
 102. Dr. phil. Helene Stöcker, Berlin; Editor of the Monthly *Die Neue Generation* (The New Generation); Vice-President of the German Peace-Council.
 103. Dr. Strahl, Berlin; Oberregierungsrat (Councillor of the Government); Director of the *Reichszentrale für Heimdienst*.
 104. Dr. jur. Karl Strupp, Lecturer on Public Law at the University of Frankfort-on-the-Main; Editor of the *Wörterbuch des Völkerrechts* (Encyclopaedia of International Law); Co-Editor of the Journal and the Yearbook on International Law; Member of the German People's Party.

105. Franz Ritter von Stuck, Painter; Professor at the Academy of Arts in Munich.
106. Lieutenant-Colonel Otto von Stülpnagel, Berlin; Commissioner on the Parliamentary Investigating Committee of the Reichstag regarding the War.
107. Dr. Albert Südekum, Berlin; form. Prussian Minister of Finance; Co-Editor of the German Municipal Yearbook and of the *Handwörterbuch der Kommunalwissenschaften* (Encyclopaedia of Municipal Science); Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.
108. Fritz Tarnow, Berlin; Member of the German Federal Economic Council; President of the German Woodworkers' Union; Member of the Socialdemocratic Party.
109. Dr. Friedrich Thimme, Berlin; Director of the Library of the Prussian Diet; Co-Editor of the German Official Documents *Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1870—1914*.
110. Johannes Tiedje, Berlin; Councillor in the German Department of the Interior; Expert of the German Government in the Peace Negotiations concerning Schleswig.
111. Johannes Timm, Munich; form. Bavarian Minister of Justice; Member of the Bavarian Diet, Socialdemocrat.
112. Dr. phil., Dr. jur. h. c. Ferdinand Tönnies, Professor of Political Science at the University of Kiel; Philosopher and Sociologist; Author of *Die Schuldfrage* (The War Guilt Question), *Der Zarismus und seine Bundesgenossen 1914* (Tsarism and its Allies in 1914) etc.
113. Carl Ulitzka, Clergyman in Ratibor (Upper Silesia); Honorary Canon at the Cathedral of Breslau; Stellvertretender Landeshauptmann (Vice-President) of Upper Silesia; Member of the Reichstag and the Executive Committee of the Centre Party.
114. Dr. Veit Valentin, Berlin; form. Professor of History at the University of Friburg (Baden), lecturing since 1918 at the Commercial Academy of Berlin; Recorder at the German Federal Archives; Author of *Deutschlands Außenpolitik 1890—1918* (Germany's Foreign Policy 1890—1918) etc.; Member of the Democratic Party.
115. Dr. Johannes M. Verweyen, Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Bonn; Author of *Deutschlands geistige Erneuerung* (Germany's Spiritual Regeneration); Socialist.
116. Dr. phil. Emmy Voigtländer, Leipzig; Art Historian; Member of the German People's Party.

117. Rudolf Wissell, Berlin; form. German Federal Minister for Economics (Reichswirtschaftsminister); Member of the German Federal Economic Council and of the Reichstag, Socialdemocrat.
118. Theodor Wolff, Chief Editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt*.
119. Dr. J. Zenneck, Professor of Experimental Physics at the Technical University of Munich; Member of the Bavarian Academy of Science.
120. Dr. jur. et rer. pol. Philipp Zorn, Professor of Constitutional and International Law at the University of Bonn; King's Privy Counsel; German Delegate at both the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907; Member of the German National People's Party.

European Policy from 1870 to 1914

By Hermann Lutz

"The war of 1914 was the outcome of three separate but simultaneous antagonisms. The oldest was the quarrel of France and Germany over Alsace and Lorraine. Second in order of time was the competition of Russia and Austria for hegemony in the Near East. The most recent was the rivalry between Great Britain and Germany for the command of the seas" (G. P. Gooch, *Franco-German Relations 1871 to 1914*, London 1923, p. 3).

The following presentation does not claim to be an exhaustive chronicle of the numerous events which caused the World War. In such a limited space this would not be possible. It seeks to demonstrate, by examining the principle episodes which conduced to international friction, that in no case can responsibility for them be found exclusively on one side. The reader will notice that I base my judgements chiefly on the results of investigations by distinguished British historians. Their books can easily be referred to. They are:

C. Raymond Beazley, *Nineteenth Century Europe and Britain*. London 1922. — William Harbutt Dawson, *The German Empire 1867—1914*. 2 vols. London 1919. — G. P. Gooch, *History of Modern Europe 1878 to 1919*. London 1923. — G. P. Gooch, *Franco-German Relations 1871 to 1914*. London 1923. — James Wycliffe Headlam (-Morley), *Bismarck and the Foundation of the German Empire*. London 1899. — J. Holland Rose, *The Origins of the War*. Cambridge 1914. — J. Holland Rose, *The Development of the European Nations 1870—1914*. Fifth ed. London 1916. — Sir Adolphus William Ward, *Germany 1815—1890*. 3 vols. Cambridge 1916, 1917, 1918.

I further mention especially the books and writings of E. D. Morel, M. P.: *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy*, with a

foreword by J. Ramsay Macdonald, London 1915¹; *Truth and the War*, with an introduction by Philip Snowden, London 1916; *Tsardom's Part in the War*, London 1917; *Pre-War Diplomacy*, with a preface by Philip Snowden, London 1919; *Diplomacy Revealed*, London 1921; *The Poison that Destroys*, London 1922; *Military Preparations for the Great War*, London 1922, etc. Even during the war E. D. Morel was energetically supported in his attitude towards the question of responsibility by men like the Hon. Bertrand Russell (*Justice in Wartime*, London 1915), and G. Lowes Dickinson (*The European Anarchy*, London 1916). Associated with him are also M. Edith Durham (*Twenty Years of Balkan Tangle*, London 1920), Hamilton Fyfe (*The Making of an Optimist*, London 1921), and others.

The main thesis of E. D. Morel, that Germany was by no means solely guilty for the war, is being more and more recognised by prominent British historians. Morel was the first Englishman to realize the immense significance of the question of responsibility, and he has published numerous articles on the subject in his monthly *Foreign Affairs* where Professor C. Raymond Beazley, amongst others, contributes regularly on the same subject.

Occasionally I have quoted documents from the Russian, Serbian, Belgian, and German archives. Insofar as the publication of the latter is not yet complete², the critical analysis by Erich Brandenburg, *Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege*, Berlin 1924, can be used. In the January issue 1923 of the *Journal of British Institute of International Affairs* G. P. Gooch reviewed

¹ First published in 1912 under the title *Morocco in Diplomacy*.

² *Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1870—1914*, edited by Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme; vols. I—VI, Berlin 1922; vols. VII—XII, Berlin 1923, vols. XIII—XVIII, Berlin 1924. These vols. cover the period from 1870 to 1903. The rest of the documents are to come out during 1924 and early in 1925.

the most important documentary disclosures up to 1922, entitled *Recent Revelations on European Diplomacy*. This reprint is to be heartily recommended. Whoever wishes to acquire a closer knowledge of the developments leading to the war will find reliable guides in Gooch's *History of Modern Europe*, and in *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783—1919*, vol. III (1866—1919), Cambridge 1923, which was brought out under the collaboration of Sir A. W. Ward, G. P. Gooch, Sir Valentine Chirol, and W. H. Dawson.

I. The Franco-German War of 1870

“Bismarck, of course, wanted war; but so did Gramont, and I hold that *the latter* brought it about” (Rose, *Development*, p. 45).

It was a principle of French policy for centuries to prevent the unification of Germany. For the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866 Napoleon III demanded compensations on the Rhine and even aspired to the annexation of Belgium. There were negotiations for an alliance between France and Austria against Prussia, in order to take mutual “Revenge for Sadowa”. In the years before 1870 the French Parliament, the leading newspapers, and responsible French Ministers left no doubt about their determination to regard the unification of Germany as a cause for war.

When with the approval of King William of Prussia, Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern renounced his candidature to the throne offered to him by Spain, at the demand of France, the French Government wished to crown its diplomatic victory by a further humiliation. It required from King William an assurance that the candidature should never be renewed. When Gladstone heard of this he wrote to Lord Granville, then Foreign Minister:

“It is our duty to represent the immense responsibility which will rest upon France, if she does not at once accept as satisfactory and conclusive the withdrawal of the candidature of Prince Leopold” (Rose, *Development*, p. 46).

Bismarck published the Ems despatch in a condensed form which deepened the impression of the insult received.

"To describe this as 'forgery' is childish; and there was nothing in the altered telegram untrue to the spirit of the King's action, or to the indignation personally expressed by him . . ." (Ward II., p. 442. — Similar opinions in Beazley, pp. 179/80; Headlam, pp. 338/40; Rose, *Development*, p. 45).

In the war of 1870 the sympathies of Europe were decidedly on the side of Germany.

"Outside France the annexation of Alsace and a portion of Lorraine was generally regarded as the natural punishment of the Power which had declared war and had been defeated. And where is the nation which, with bitter memories like those of the invasions of Louis XIV and Napoleon, would have returned empty-handed from a sanguinary struggle, and would have left in the possession of its defeated enemy rich territories which had formed part of its own vanished empire? If France had won, she would doubtless have annexed the whole or part of the Rhineland. It is a crime to transfer masses of human beings from one allegiance to another against their will, but it is the common practice of conquerors. The peacemakers of 1919 have no title to cast stones at the peacemakers of 1871" (Gooch, *Relations*, p. 4).

It is well known that Bismarck personally would have given up Metz. Only those who know of the unexampled devastations of the Palatinate and other districts of South Germany by French Generals during preceding centuries are able to appreciate the German wish for security at that time.

"From the historical standpoint Bismarck was right. With the exception of Metz and its district, Alsace-Lorraine belonged to Germany by right of ancient possession. It was partly by force, partly by fraud, that Louis XIV acquired Strassburg and neighbouring towns. Further, the German plea was tenable on military grounds. Under the two Napoleons France had recklessly disturbed the peace of Europe; and we are suffering now (1914)¹ from the final results of the Napoleonic policy. The recollections of the times of the two Emperors still haunt the brain of Germany . . ." (Rose, *Origins*, p. 92)².

¹ The brackets in the quotations are inserted by Lutz.

² Headlam holds almost the same view as Rose: "The arguments for the annexation of Alsace were indeed unanswerable" (p. 374). Numerous other opinions of British historians could be quoted to show that, with the ex-

The world admired France for paying the war indemnity of £ 200,000,000 in a few years. A comparison, unfavourable to Germany, is drawn in regard to German reparations since 1919. But it is surely fair to bear in mind the fundamentally different position: In 1870 France had only one opponent; the war lasted only a few months—not nearly five years; France kept all her Colonies, her whole shipping, all the foreign assets of her citizens—whereas almost all these were taken away from a completely exhausted Germany; immediately after the war France could do unrestricted business with the countries which had remained neutral and which were able to place large orders, such as Great Britain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and America—while Germany, which lost her most valuable mineral wealth, is crippled internally and externally through extreme lack of raw materials and by the Treaty of Versailles.

The Institute of Economics of The Carnegie Corporation has thoroughly investigated the "Reparation" problem in the book *Germany's Capacity To Pay* by Harold G. Moulton and Constantine E. McGuire (New York 1923). According to the London "settlement" of May 1921 the debt of Germany amounts to £ 6,800,000,000 (p. 60). This is almost double the total production of gold in the entire world since the discovery

ception of Metz and neighbourhood, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was justified from the historical standpoint of that time. J. A. Cramb even says: "The war of 1870 with France was a war of great revenge, of *just* revenge, and for one of the greatest of causes. No war in history, perhaps, was ever more just than the war which Bismarck and Moltke waged against France . . . from France she (Prussia) had endured insult upon insult, measureless humiliations" (*Germany and England*, London 1914, pp. 11, 22). — It should further be observed that the French press of 1870/71 freely accused the Germans of cruel warfare: "charges which were untrue, for, according to the unanimous testimony of foreign observers who accompanied the army, the moderation of the German soldiers was as remarkable as their successes" (*Headlam*, p. 363).

of America! (p. 10). France paid her war debt almost entirely by loans which to a considerable extent were subscribed to in Germany, and did not even increase taxation sufficiently to cover the interest on these loans (pp. 220—233). By way of contrast Germany has parted virtually with nothing but capital assets which according to the estimates of the *Institute of Economics* amounted to £ 1,250,000,000 up to the beginning of 1923. In this sum neither the values of the Colonies and the other detached territories, nor the disbursements for the military occupation are included (pp. 56—97).

When in the beginning of September 1873 the last German soldiers left French soil, the President of the Republic, Marshal Mac Mahon, wrote to the Chief of the German army of occupation, General von Manteuffel:

“At the moment the German troops are about to evacuate French territory, I believe it to be my duty to express my sentiments to their commanding officer, concerning the justice and impartiality which he has displayed in the difficult mission entrusted to him” (*Die Große Politik*, I, document No. 117).

That this appreciation was deserved is shown by a letter of Comte de Saint-Vallier, French Commissioner attached to General von Manteuffel, written to Thiers, *Ex-President* of the French Republic, on September 27, 1873:

“Good General von Manteuffel . . . remained the same to the end, always just, conciliable, friendly. Though Prussian, he also deserves a page of sincere gratitude in our annals” (*La Libération du Territoire. Correspondance d'A. Thiers*, 2 vols., Paris 1903).

II. Bismarck's Policy from 1870 to 1890

“The story of Franco-German relations since 1871 is the record of France's endeavour to regain her lost territories and of Germany's attempt to retain them. The one remembered the aggression of 1870, the other the settlement of 1871 . . .” (Gooch, *Relations*, p. 5).

"His (Bismarck's) steadfast aim was the maintenance at all costs of the peace of Europe, since peace was Germany's first interest and greatest asset... Never once did he swerve from this aim..." (Dawson, II, p. 371; see also pp. 82 and 245/6. — Similarly in Beazley, p. 204).

France suffered not only through her defeat and the Peace of Frankfort, but just as much from the loss of her long assumed and practised hegemony on the Continent. The victor had not imposed any form of restriction upon her armaments. Very soon after the war the Republic had just as strong an army as Germany. In 1875 a crisis developed resulting from extensive French military preparations which aroused the desire for a preventive war in German military circles. But there is no ground for the accusation that Bismarck also at that time wanted war (viz. Beazley, p. 207; Dawson, II, pp. 99/104; Gooch, *History*, p. 157; Gooch, *Relations*, p. 14; Headlam, p. 385).

The German official documents prove that during the Chancellorship of Bismarck it was his untiring effort, to prevent a war between the European Powers. In order to reconcile France, he furthered her colonial ambitions, especially in Tunis; he worked unremittedly for a peaceful adjustment of the Russian and Austrian antagonism in the Balkans, and he supported the English occupation of Egypt. Bismarck succeeded in averting the repeated danger of war between England and Russia during 1877/78 (see above all *Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette*, vol. II, documents No. 375—406). Before the Berlin Congress of 1878 the Chancellor promised "to act the part of the 'honest broker' who has no interests of his own to serve, and he faithfully kept his word" (Dawson, II, p. 129). But he earned the growing ill-will and enmity of Russia which caused him to conclude the defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary, an event, which Salisbury received as "good tidings of great joy" (Gooch, *History*, p. 47). The whole completion of Bismarck's system of alliances was solely devoted to the security of the Empire.

In 1887 there arose an especially menacing war danger from both East and West. At that time the French War Minister Boulanger on two occasions proposed measures to his Government which would have led to war (Gooch, *Relations*, p. 31). Russia armed threateningly.

"So imminent did a Franco-German war appear during the opening weeks of 1887 that Salisbury was forced to consider the British attitude if it should break out. In 1870 Gladstone and Granville had saved Belgium from attack by agreeing to intervene against whichever of the combatants violated its neutrality. In 1887, however, the sympathies of the Prime Minister were deeply engaged on the side of the Central Powers, and, being convinced that peace was threatened by Russia and France alone, he desired not to intervene if Germany, in repelling a French attack, were to march through Belgium . . . he wrote to Lord Lyons (Feb. 5) that it was difficult not to wish for a second Franco-German war "to end this ceaseless trouble"¹ (Gooch, *History*, pp. 134/5).

The British press of those days, including the semi-official *Standard*, was willing to concede to Germany a passage through Belgium on the ground that the German armies could not be expected to force their way through the chain of French fortresses along the frontier. The German Government resisted the alluring temptation.

"It required Bismarck's utmost skill as mediator and moderator to keep the peace . ." (Gooch, *History*, p. 152).

In the eighties Anglo-German relations were clouded only by passing friction over colonial matters. Bismarck had rendered very valuable services to British policy in Egypt which were warmly acknowledged not only by several Members of the British Cabinet, but also by the Prince of Wales

¹ That this was not an isolated view is shown by the remark of Lord Randolph Churchill, member of the inner Cabinet, to the German Ambassador in London in December 1886: "Au fond, c'est la France qui est notre ennemie commune, et nous n'aurons du repos que quand elle sera complètement écrasée (After all, France is our common enemy, and we shall never have peace until she is completely crushed.—*Die Große Politik*, IV, document No. 877).

(*Die Große Politik*, IV, documents No. 747/8, 754, 755). Therefore he expected that London would not hamper Germany's modest colonial ambitions. W. H. Dawson who has made a thorough investigation of Anglo-German bickering in this respect in *The Colonial Era* (II, pp. 167—214; see also pp. 147, 161), wrote:

“Let it be said frankly that in the colonial controversies of 1884 and 1885 England put herself in the wrong . . .” (p. 206).

The attitude of England irritated Bismarck; he retaliated, and so on both sides ill-humour was engendered which at the bottom was never forgotten (compare Gooch, *History*, pp. 108/9, 212; Gooch, *Relations*, pp. 21/2; Beazley, p. 244).

From the Congress of Berlin to the fall of Bismarck the question of an alliance between the two Powers was repeatedly discussed. Fundamentally both sides were agreed, but, in the main, it was Parliamentary considerations which stood in the way of concluding an alliance. Even as it was, England became at one time “almost a partner in the Triple Alliance” (Gooch, *History*, p. 142), and she signed agreements with Austria-Hungary and Italy in 1887. (Concerning the friendly relations of England to the Powers of the Triple Alliance see chiefly *Die Große Politik*, IV, documents No. 709—819, 861 to 955.)

III. The Franco-Russian Alliance—Emperor William II

“The Franco-Russian Alliance . . . must be aggressive, if it does not want to disappoint the hopes which gave it birth” (the Belgian Minister in London on August 1, 1891, to Brussels, *Zur Europäischen Politik*, vol. V, No. 78, Berlin 1919).

Bismarck's successors lacked his dexterous hand. In addition, the peculiar temperament of Emperor William II rendered an equitable management of affairs exceedingly difficult. When all the documentary evidence is known the

verdict on the Kaiser will be far milder. But let it be frankly admitted that by his speeches and gestures he many a time introduced an unhealthy excitement into political affairs and aroused serious misgivings. But the main question should be this: Did he ever during his long reign desire and work for war? History answers this question with a decided negative.

The abandonment of the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia accelerated the Franco-Russian Alliance which had been in the air for some time. It was nominally formed for pure defence. Yet the Franco-Russian negotiations distinctly show that France, remembering the lost provinces, aimed at Germany, whereas Russia, in view of her Balkan aspirations, regarded Austria-Hungary as the enemy. Moreover, Delcassé, the French Foreign Minister, succeeded in enlarging the treaty (1899) in an aggressive sense by speculating on the disintegration of the Hapsburg Monarchy at the death of Emperor Francis Joseph (*L'Alliance Franco-Russe*, Paris 1918).

“From the standpoint of European politics the conclusion of the alliance was a sign that the reign of Bismarck was over. “The nightmare of coalitions”, which haunted his later years, was beginning to take concrete shape. Henceforward Europe was divided into two armed camps, and entered on the path which led straight to the catastrophe of 1914. The Triple Alliance remained stronger than its rival, and so long as it could count on the sympathy of Great Britain its position was unassailable. But if Great Britain should ever be compelled to transfer her support from the older to the younger group, the diplomatic situation would be transformed, and the balance of power would be tilted against the Central Empires” (Gooch, *History*, pp. 186/7).

IV. The Kruger Telegram—“Made in Germany”

“The Kruger telegram was neither forgotten nor forgiven” (Gooch, *History*, p. 298).

The rapid growth of the German people and of German commerce forced the German Government to keep oversea markets open as much as possible. It often acted unjudiciously

and occasionally in a reckless manner — which is often the case with a young and strong race, especially as old guests are usually slow in making room at the table for newcomers. It is from this point of view that the foolish and provocative Kruger telegram after the lawless raid of Dr. Jameson should be considered.

“Technically, we were in the wrong; and Mr. Chamberlain promptly disavowed the raiders” (Rose, *Origins*, p. 58).

It was too little known in Germany that the Boer Republics were subject to the suzerainty of Britain. To-day there is practically no well-informed German who approves of the Kruger despatch.

“The German Government, which had no wish for war, saw that it had gone too far” (Gooch, *History*, p. 220).

A few years later, by its attitude during the Boer War, the Berlin Government made amends for its blunder of January 1896. (Regarding the origin and the effect of the Kruger telegram consult Dawson, II, pp. 383/5; Gooch, *History*, pp. 219/21).

The unprecedented industrial boom of Germany, against which the law of *Made in Germany* proved to be a failure, irritated and disturbed certain circles in Great Britain. The *Saturday Review* became the mouthpiece of these interests and in numerous articles from 1895—1898 it preached the destruction of Germany which, it argued, would make each Englishman so much richer. Though this journal no longer possessed any special influence¹ the effect of these articles on German public opinion was profound.

¹ Gooch says in his *History*, p. 227, “that the journal no longer exercised the smallest political influence”. He, in fact, appears to attach very little importance to Anglo-German commercial rivalry as a cause of war. Sir A. W. Ward seems to entertain a somewhat different opinion (vol. III, p. 385). — The terms of the Treaty of Versailles and their enforcement have again stamped the conviction into the minds of many Germans that the jealousy of her neighbours regarding German commercial development did exist as a driving political impulse.

V. England offers an Alliance to Germany

"It would be unjustifiable to regard the measures adopted at that time (1900) in the name of *Weltpolitik* as deliberately intended to be a provocative challenge to other countries . . . To acquit them (the German statesmen) of deliberate design to disturb the tranquillity of Europe is not to condone the policy which had that effect" (Dawson, II, pp. 439/40).

Germany's fate was decided at the turn of the century. The British Government in 1898 had forced France by threat of war into a retreat from Fashoda (Gooch, *History*, p. 294). A year later England found herself entangled in a protracted war against the Boer Republics in which the latter had the sympathies of almost the whole world on their side. Russia pressed irresistibly towards the Far East. "Splendid isolation" was felt in British governing circles to be no longer a practicable policy. Three times between 1898 and 1901, the British Government made overtures to Germany for a regular alliance, which had the approval of the Prince of Wales (later King Edward VII). Morocco, China, and territories in Asia-Minor and in Africa, were to be mutually developed. It was unfortunate that the virtual manager in the Berlin Foreign Office at that time, and until 1906, was a man with a peculiar turn of mind, von Holstein (Gooch, *History*, pp. 197/8). He, too, wanted the alliance with England, but only for an absolutely sure price, and he deeply distrusted what he believed to be the secret objects of England. For Mr. Chamberlain had succeeded in conveying to German statesmen the conviction that he desired to check Russia in the Far East. But it lay in Germany's interest to keep on good terms with her neighbour Russia, and Berlin, not without reason, apprehended that an alliance with England would result in a speedy breach with Russia. Holstein took to be "bluff", England's repeated warnings, that, if she could not ally herself with Germany, she would turn to France and Russia, even at the cost of great sacrifices. As it was, the negotiations which lasted almost three

years, came to nought, not because of Germany's evil designs against England, but because she was unwilling to compromise her relations with Russia for ever, and because German diplomacy believed that eventually England would make further advances to Germany. The wavering, indecisive behaviour of Berlin aroused deep distrust in London. The result was, first, that Great Britain (with the aid of German diplomats¹) allied herself with Japan, and two years afterwards (1904) concluded the *Entente* with France.

Twice during the Boer War, Russia, in agreement with France, suggested to Berlin a joint intervention against England; but this was frustrated through the conduct of Germany (Dawson, II, p. 386; Gooch, *Relations*, p. 39). When Emperor Wilhelm hurried to the death-bed of his grandmother, Queen Victoria, he was warmly received by both the British Court and people. The impression made by the Kruger telegram seemed to have been effaced.

VI. The first Moroccan Crisis of 1905 to 1906

"... if any Powers were more than others under a moral pledge to respect the status quo (of Morocco), those Powers were France, Great Britain, and Spain. On the other hand, the Power which next to Great Britain had in the past shown the greatest desire to work harmoniously with the rest of Europe in all dealings with an empire whose ruler responded unwillingly to outside influences was Germany... the essential fact to be emphasized... is that neither Great Britain nor France had any proprietary rights whatever, actual or contingent, in Morocco, and strictly speaking had no business to discuss, still less to dispose of, the future of the sultanate at all" (Dawson, II, pp. 406, 410).

Egypt and Morocco were the basis for the Anglo-French *Entente*. Germany had long disinterested herself from Egyptian affairs. This was not the case with Morocco. Germany had signed the International Madrid Convention of 1880 as a

¹ See A. M. Pooley, *Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi*, London 1915.

Power enjoying the same privileges as others, and had later, in understanding with the signatories, made a commercial treaty with Morocco. The Conventions signed in 1904 between England and France, and France and Spain, contained secret clauses regulating the partition of Morocco between France and Spain. These secret clauses were in contradiction to the public Conventions of 1904 concerning the maintenance of Moroccan Sovereignty and Integrity, and were only revealed in 1911.

“By this questionable device both Governments left themselves a loophole for escaping from the public promise” (Rose, *Origins*, p. 71).

In the published Conventions of 1904, associated with the declarations of French Ministers, the German Government saw no encroachment upon its rights. But it soon found out about the secret clauses and determined then, to act in protection of its interests.

“Thus of the Powers specially interested in the trade of Morocco, Germany, whose share in that trade exceeded the shares of Spain and Italy combined, though it fell far below that of either Great Britain or France, was the only one to be ignored. For Germans this reflection was the more galling when it was recalled how loyally their Government had supported successive British Governments in their opposition to the endeavours of France to assert a predominant influence in the country, and how only a few years before a British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Chamberlain, had vaguely suggested the partition of Morocco on a method which would have given to Germany a seaport and a sphere of influence on the Atlantic coast . . . a grave mistake was committed by the French and British Governments in ignoring Germany so deliberately in a matter in which she had a legitimate claim, in virtue of treaty rights and commercial interests, to be consulted . . . The importance of Germany’s material stake in Morocco was indisputable” (Dawson, II, pp. 418/9; see about the whole Morocco crisis pp. 404—30; Gooch, *History*, pp. 340—68; Gooch, *Relations*, pp. 40—7; Rose, *Origins*, pp. 68—82).

As a protest against the provocative behaviour of the statesmen of the *Entente*, the Emperor went to Tangier at the advice and instigation of Bülow. The Chancellor later made a still graver mistake by insisting upon the Conference of

Algeciras. For the French Prime Minister, M. Rouvier, was ready to grant liberal concessions to Germany in exchange for a free hand in Morocco. Bülow purposely kept these offers from the knowledge of the Emperor; because he believed that he would fare better, if—for reasons of prestige, and in deference to the public promises of the Kaiser to the Sultan of Morocco—he seized the opportunity of giving France a lesson which should prevent her from disregarding Germany in future. When two years later the Emperor heard of these offers of Rouvier, he wrote:

“If I had known of this I would have accepted at once, and the whole stupid Conference of Algeciras would never have taken place” (unpublished German documents, cf. Brandenburg, pp. 214/5).

The consequences of this policy were fateful. Sir Edward Grey made it clear that England would support France even with arms should she be attacked by Germany because of Morocco, and the Conference cemented the *Entente* more firmly. The German Government, however, never intended to make Morocco a cause of war. The German documents on this episode soon to be published will prove this.

“Bülow had had a good hand but had played it badly. The process which Germans describe as encirclement, and Englishmen as insurance, had begun” (Gooch, *History*, p. 368)¹.

VII. The German War Office furthers the task of Lord Haldane

“I do not think, that my impression was wrong that even the responsible heads of the Army were then (1906) looking almost entirely to ‘peaceful penetration’ with only moral assistance from the prestige attaching to the possession of great armed forces in reserve” (Viscount Haldane, *Before the War*, London 1920, p. 26).

Immediately after the German Government in 1901 had let slip the third and most important English proposal for an al-

¹ Both G. P. Gooch, and J. Holland Rose, refer in their description of the Moroccan crises to E. D. Morel's book *Morocco in Diplomacy*, London 1912. See also page 55.

liance, a portion of the leading British press took—more fiercely than before—a strong line against Germany. The German press followed suit. British irritation with Germany increased during the Russo-Japanese War. This fact and the general attitude of the *Entente* induced the Kaiser to work for an alliance with Russia as a protection against British assumptions. The Treaty of Björko in 1905 between the Kaiser and the Tsar did not receive the sanction of either the German or Russian Governments and, therefore, never became effective. The fact that France was to be the third party in the alliance shows clearly that in spite of the then highly favourable military situation of Germany there was no wish on the German side for a war with France as has so often been suggested.

Early in 1906, at the instigation of France the secret “conversations” between the French and English Army and Naval Staffs began. Eventually they developed into a fully detailed plan of mutual operations in the event of a German attack on France. According to the book *How The War Came* (London 1919) by Earl Loreburn (Chancellor in the Liberal Cabinet), these conversations involved Great Britain in a kind of alliance with France, and through France with Russia. Early in 1906, Lord Haldane ascertained that if Britain was to carry out the new policy of military co-operation with France, the British army must be thoroughly reorganized. In the autumn of 1906 he was invited to the German manœuvres and was given ample opportunity to make a study of the German war-machine at the German War Office. What Lord Haldane there learned contributed considerably, as he admits, towards furthering his task. After three years he was in the position, he tells us,

“rapidly to mobilise, not only 100,000, but 160,000 (men); to transport them, with the aid of the Navy, to a place of concentration which had been settled between the Staffs of France and Britain; and to have

them at their appointed place within twelve days, an interval based on what the German army required on its side for a corresponding concentration" (*Before the War*, p. 33)¹.

Consider the significance of this. A sharp crisis had just passed. It had made the strength of the Anglo-French *Entente* apparent. Yet the German Government had voluntarily initiated the British War Minister into its own military system, through which England's preparedness for war was admittedly assisted. *Will any one contend that the German Government would have so acted if it had in the least thought of a war with England and France, or believed it to be probable?*

VIII. Persia—Anglo-German Naval Rivalry

"In spite of this", Sir Charles Hardinge remarked to me (Foreign Minister Isvolsky, in June 1908), "one cannot close one's eyes to the fact, that, if Germany should continue to increase her naval armaments at the same accelerated pace, a most alarming and strained situation might arise in Europe in 7 or 8 years. Then, without doubt, Russia would be the arbiter of the situation; it is for this reason that we, in the interest of peace and the preservation of the balance of power, desire that Russia be as strong as possible on land and on sea" (*Entente Diplomacy and the World, Matrix of the History of Europe, 1909—14*, by B. de Siebert and George Abel Schreiner, New York 1921, London 1923, p. 479).

"By the ententes of his (King Edward's) reign . . . there was accomplished, in fact, what German distrust imputed to him as an ideal, an 'encirclement' of Germany" (Beazley, p. 256).

The British *Entente* with Russia was also consummated at the expense of a free and independent country: Persia. It must

¹ On page 31 in the same volume Lord Haldane tells us that the problem he set himself, as War Minister to solve, was "how to mobilise and concentrate at a place of assembly to be opposite the Belgian frontier, a force calculated as adequate (with the assistance of Russian pressure in the East)"*, — thus proving, *inter alia*, that as far back as 1906 the co-operation of Russia on the Franco-British side in the event of a war with the Central Powers was accepted British military strategy.

* Haldane's brackets.

be taken for granted that the British Government did not foresee by what methods Imperial Russia would exploit that unhappy country. Here, too, one purpose of the Convention was not to allow Germany to exercise any political influence in Persia and to exclude her commercially as far as possible.

In the meantime Germany herself through her naval policy had entered on a dangerous path. The Navy was a pet idea of the Kaiser ever since his youth. Since 1897 Tirpitz had been his right hand and came to exercise considerable influence over him.

“Long before Englishmen had begun to suspect the designs of the German navy, Germans had felt alarm at the strength of the British fleet” (Gooch, *History*, p. 428).

The destruction of the Spanish fleet by America in 1897, the Boer War during which England unwarrantedly intercepted German steamers, the annihilation of the Russian fleet by Japan and other events, had awakened in Germany the desire for a strong navy to protect her colonies and her growing oversea trade. The majority of German historians admit that, though commercial rivalry created some tension between England and Germany, the German fleet was the decisive factor in the situation. Tirpitz wanted to make the navy strong enough to compel England to recognize the German Empire as an equal. Since Germany had—not in numbers, but in efficiency—the strongest army, it is comprehensible that Great Britain felt herself menaced by the German Fleet, especially as a new grouping of the Powers was not entirely out of the question. But from the German archives there is no proof whatever to be derived for the contention that the fleet was built for aggressive purposes. This accusation which has so often been put forth, is not tenable.

The Kaiser was seriously afraid of British superiority at sea. The plans of Lord Fisher “to Copenhagen” the German

navy "à la Nelson" in the midst of peace, became known to the Emperor as early as the end of 1905, and up to the World War he stuck to his conviction that the British fleet would some day make an onslaught upon Germany (unpublished German documents, Brandenburg, pp. 242, 345).

On both sides reprehensible tactics were indulged in. To these belonged the *Navy Scare* of 1909 (Gooch, *History*, p.446), and the fear of a German invasion. The British people were fed with this idea, although their experts knew that a landing of German troops in England was impossible.

Mutual distrust grew. Several English attempts to make Germany limit her naval armaments failed, mainly because the British Government was not inclined to enter into a satisfactory political arrangement with Germany in order that its relations to France and Russia might not be compromised. But it must be emphasized that finally, in 1913, Tirpitz agreed to a ratio of 16: 10 battleships which ensured a considerable British preponderance.

IX. The Hague Conferences

"Proposals for a diminution of armaments made in connexion with the Hague Conference of 1907 were not well received by Germany, and such proposals are not likely to be well received so long as Great Britain maintains her claim to the overwhelming maritime supremacy which is necessary to her safety" (Stanley Leathes in *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XII, Cambridge 1910, p. 56).

Germany's attitude at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 was subsequently severely criticized. This criticism is only partly justified. On the whole the charges go decidedly too far. As so often happened in the German diplomatic handling of events, appearances were more against Germany than realities. It has always been difficult for the Briton on his sea-girt island to imagine himself in the totally different position of the German. To-day, since the air-fleets with their de-

vastating gasbombs have made the natural safety of islands illusionary, it may be easier for the British to appreciate what her geographical situation meant to Germany before the war: In the west an implacable enemy who despite a far smaller population maintained as large an army, sometimes even a larger one, than Germany; in the east almost entirely open frontiers with a neighbour whose population increased rapidly and who could flood Germany with his innumerable masses (the "steam-roller"!). In this wedged-in position the German Empire was compelled for its own safety to maintain a strong army, as Mr. Lloyd George and other prominent British politicians freely admitted before the war.

Sir Frederick Pollock has written in chapter XXII: *The Modern Law Of Nations And The Prevention Of War* of *The Cambridge Modern History*, vol. XII, pp. 724/5:

"In 1907, any serious discussion of the topic was declared impracticable beforehand. Indeed, it seems fairly plain to any one acquainted with the conduct of public business, that any arrangement for the reduction of armaments by mutual agreement among the Powers must involve the settlement of some proportionate scheme founded on considerations not only of the magnitude of the several States concerned but of the character of the interests to be protected and the protection reasonably required; further, that such a scheme cannot be established without some recognised comparative standard of naval and military power; and, moreover, that there are great technical difficulties in fixing such a standard, especially with regard to naval units of widely varying date, design, functions, and efficiency. Then, it seems hard to believe that for the necessary exchange of views on all these details, many of them entangled with confidential matter, an open conference of delegates from all the Governments in the world is the fittest place, or a fit or hopeful place at all . . . Within five years the sovereign who had convened the first Peace Conference was himself involved in war on a great scale by land and sea" (for a similar opinion see Stanley Leathes in the same book, p. 7. — I further refer to Ward, III, pp. 396/7. — About the selfish motive for the first Conference cf. Gooch, *History*, pp. 306/7).

The attitude of Germany at the Hague Conferences was wrong and it gave rise to suspicion and distrust. But the

examples quoted show how sceptical people were in England even after the second Hague Conference, at which the British Government refused to give up the much censured right of capture at sea.

X. The Bosnian Crisis 1908/9

“The Bosnia-Herzegovina question will be decided by war alone” (The Tsar in November 1908 to the Serbian Minister Pasitch. See M. Bogitshevich, *Causes of the War*, London 1920, pp. 111/12).

With energy and skill, Bismarck had managed to prevent the long threatening clash of Austria and Russia over the Balkans. As soon as Russia devoted herself to her Asiatic ambitions quietude reigned in the Balkans. It should in fairness be acknowledged that the Austrian Government (like the German) did not try to take advantage of Russia's powerlessness in 1905—6 to extend its influence farther east.

Bismarck had always made it clear to Vienna that the Dual Monarchy could not expect any German support for its Balkan aspirations. Prince Bülow assumed another attitude. In an instruction of July 25, 1908, he recommended that all convulsions or a general conflagration in the Balkans should be avoided; but he added:

“Our attitude in all Balkan questions should be guided in the first place by the needs, interests and wishes of Austria-Hungary” (unpublished German documents, Brandenburg, p. 267).

This corresponded to Bülow's sometimes rather careless conduct of affairs. But it must be vigorously emphasized that he was in no way responsible for the Bosnian crisis. The Austrian Foreign Minister, Baron Aehrenthal, acted without any German suggestion, and he informed Bülow by letter only on September 26, 1908, of his intention, reassuring him that he had arranged the matter with Russia. As a matter of fact, two weeks before in Buchlau, Isvolsky, Russia's Foreign

Minister, had agreed in principle to an early annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in exchange for the diplomatic support of Vienna for the opening of the Dardanelles to Russian Men-of-War. Isvolsky fancied that he could easily win over France and England for this project; but it foundered especially in London.

At the Berlin Congress England had proposed that Austria-Hungary should occupy and administer both the provinces. Then even annexation pure and simple would have generally been permitted. In the eighties Russia repeatedly acquiesced, without any compensation, in an annexation by Austria, should she desire it. It is true that these treaties were no longer valid. But the Dual Monarchy had for 30 years accomplished a recognised work of civilisation in both provinces, and the whole of Europe knew that some day annexation would come. Moreover, Isvolsky, as already stated, had given his consent. Aehrenthal's breach of the Berlin Treaty—which other parties had infringed before—should therefore not be judged as severely as the violation of the Madrid Convention of 1880 and the partition of Persia by the Powers of the *Entente*.

Serbia which had never had any political rights in Bosnia, raged and mobilised. Russia which had been ready to sacrifice her Slav brothers for the opening of the Dardanelles, secretly goaded on the Serbs. When the crisis threatened to lead to a war of Austria against Serbia the German Government put an end to it by taking a decisive step in Petersburg on March 22, 1909. It was in the interest of peace. The Tsar expressed himself frankly grateful (unpublished German documents, Brandenburg, p. 284). But Isvolsky never forgave Germany's intervention and it is known, that henceforth he regarded revenge on Austria-Hungary as a personal aim. (Concerning the Bosnian crisis, refer to Gooch, *History*, pp. 410—426.)

Had the Central Powers pursued the sinister plans imputed to them at Versailles, then the Bosnian crisis would have been the most favourable opportunity since 1904/5 to establish a German hegemony on the Continent. For the Russian Government declared itself at that time to be in no position to wage war.

XI. Agadir (1911)

"The Panther's spring, like the Tangier speech, ruined a good legal case. Both countries had repeated the mistake of 1905. France pushed forward in Morocco without disarming German hostility, and Germany replied by banging her fist on the table. Once again Germany alienated the sympathies of the world, and once again France found comfort and support in her English friends" (Gooch, *Relations*, p. 56).¹

"The spectacle of Great Britain standing in shining armour beside France encouraged the chauvinists on both sides of the Rhine" (Gooch, *History*, p. 490).

From 1907 onwards a Franco-German understanding concerning Morocco had been preparing which led to a treaty in 1909. But in the spring of 1911 the French Republic, under the leadership of an inexperienced Foreign Minister, needlessly put an end to the Sovereignty of Morocco. France recognised Germany's right to compensations. But despite numerous reminders and a great deal of patience on Germany's part the negotiations did not advance, until on July 1, the German Government abruptly sent a small gunboat of 1000 tons and a crew of 125 men to Agadir. The purpose was to compel France to serious negotiations. Paris was not unduly excited.

The still unpublished German documents will prove that the Government did not in the least think of war and had no intention to establish itself in Morocco (Brandenburg, pp.

¹ J. H. Rose also has shown remarkable understanding for the Panther's spring (*Origins*, p. 80). Otherwise there are in his above mentioned writings a number of inaccuracies, because at that time he, of course, had no knowledge of all the new disclosures.

320—324). Sir Edward Grey, in August 1911, expressed his belief that Emperor William did not want war (*Siebert documents*, p. 599).

It is noteworthy that the Panther's spring aroused more ire in England than in France.

"It was evident . . . that . . . the British Government . . . had taken the question far more tragically than the French themselves" (Dawson, II, p. 452).

Between Germany and France serious negotiations now began. Sir Edward Grey was alarmed at exaggerated rumours regarding the German demands and gossip about a landing in Agadir. Acting under the influence of French official information, and without awaiting an answer from Berlin, Grey, in agreement with the British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, inspired the well known threatening speech of Mr. Lloyd George at the Mansion House on July 21, 1911.

"The Foreign Secretary, who must bear the chief responsibility for the decision, seems to have been unaware that he was launching a high explosive. It was precisely the same claim to be considered that the Kaiser had championed at Tangier, and it provoked the same explosion in Germany as the Tangier declaration had provoked in England. The German people saw France and Germany engaged in discussing the Moroccan question, and no French statesman had raised the alarm. Suddenly a contingent declaration of war seemed to be flung across the North Sea. It was regarded as convincing evidence that Great Britain was as eager to thwart the colonial and commercial ambitions of Germany as she was to encourage those of France" (Gooch, *History*, pp. 477/8).

In November 1911 Germany recognised the French protectorate over Morocco in return for compensations in the Congo.

"The settlement was a triumph for France, who rounded off her African Empire at the price of an unhealthy and undeveloped fragment of the tropics" (Gooch, *Relations*, pp. 56/7).

In reality, as in 1906, Germany had suffered a diplomatic defeat. On the surface, the Moroccan crises were at an end.

But they had angered and embittered public feeling in France, England, and Germany. None of the Governments concerned can be held entirely guiltless of responsibility for that. And Morocco was to entail more serious results. E. D. Morel had prophesied this already at the end of February 1912 when he wrote:

"The Moroccan problem is not settled. In one sense it may be said to be only beginning. It will loom largely on the horizon during the lifetime of the present generation".¹

XII. The Tripoli Adventure

"British opinion was equally hostile (to the Tripoli adventure of Italy); yet no word of protest or rebuke was heard from the Minister (Grey) who had so sharply condemned the far less serious offence of the annexation of Bosnia" (Gooch, *History*, p. 487).

Italy had secured herself, by Secret Treaties with France, the ultimate possession of Tripoli to compensate her for France's free hand in Morocco. The final fate of Morocco occasioned Italy to fall upon her prey. This placed the Central Powers in a very embarrassing position because of their relations to Turkey. Italy as early as 1902 had concluded a reinsurance treaty with France. Later she made a convention with Russia. According as her interests suggested, Italy inclined to one or the other group. During the Bosnian crisis she seems to have been

¹ Preface to *Morocco in Diplomacy*, Smith, Elder & Co., London 1912. This is the most detailed investigation of the Moroccan crises. The book reappeared in 1915 with a foreword by Mr. J. Ramsay Macdonald, the present Prime Minister of Great Britain, under the title *Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy. An Unheeded Warning* (six editions since). The value of the book consists amongst other things in the fact that it was written immediately after the second Moroccan crisis and published with the desire to further an Anglo-German understanding and to prevent a general war which Morel felt as the result of his historical studies was to be gravely feared if the Powers persisted in pursuing their imperialist policy.

Regarding the Agadir crisis see further Dawson, II, pp. 443—456; Gooch, *History*, pp. 470—485; Gooch, *Relations*, pp. 51—57; Rose, *Origins*, pp. 80-82.

ready to mobilise against her ally Austria-Hungary. It is true, however, that when Italy signed the Triple Alliance in 1882 (and again later on) she told her allies that she would not fight against England. Official England did not cause Italy any difficulties in her universally condemned campaign in Tripoli. The war dragged on for a whole year, it weakened Turkey still thoroughly shaken by her revolution of 1908, and it enticed the Balkan States to break loose against the wish of Russia who was not yet ready.

XIII. The Balkan Wars—"Serbia's promised Land"— Poincaré eggs Russia on

"... in this last convulsion . . . lay some of the most important and pressing causes of the universal war of 1914—1918" (Beazley, p. 259).

"The French Ambassador, who must have special reasons for saying so, has told me on several occasions that the greatest danger to the maintenance of European peace lies in the lack of discipline and in the personal policy that characterises the action of the Russian agents abroad. They are nearly all ardent Pan-Slavists, and it is they who are in great measure to blame for the present occurrences" (The Belgian Minister in Berlin on October 24, 1912.—Belgian documents No. 94)¹.

Immediately after the Bosnian crisis the Russian statesmen, in their desire for revenge, contemplated using the Balkan States against the Central Powers. The first step in this direction was the Russo-Bulgar Treaty of December 1909 which declared

¹ The Belgian Documents are not to be confused with the documents about the "Conventions Anglo-Belges" which have been misused in a regrettable fashion. The authenticity of the 119 exhaustive Belgian Documents has never been contested. They were published in the French original, together with a German translation. E. D. Morel has translated these documents into English and published them, with historical appendices in *Diplomacy Revealed*, London 1921. — Just as important are the 514 Documents from the Brussels Archives which B. Schwertfeger has brought out in the French original in the publication *Zur Europäischen Politik 1897—1914*, 5 vols., Berlin 1919.

“that the realization of the ideals of the Slav peoples in the Balkans would only be possible after a Russian victory over the Central Powers” (Gooch, *History*, p. 424; Bogitshevich, p. 90)¹.

Favoured by the Tripoli War, and under Russia's patronage, the Balkan League was formed in the spring of 1912. It was aimed in the first place against Turkey, and in the second against Austria (Beazley, p. 277; Gooch, *History*, p. 501).

After the conclusion of the Serbo-Bulgar Secret Treaty in March 1912, the Tsar said to the Serbian Crownprince

“that now the aspirations of Serbia as against Austria-Hungary would soon be fulfilled” (Bogitshevich, p. 30).

When the French Foreign Minister, Poincaré, saw this Treaty in the summer of 1912 he exclaimed: “This is an instrument of war!” He tried to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. But when Poincaré had ascertained

“that the (French) authorities and responsible persons estimate the chances of Russia and France in case of a general conflagration very optimistically” (*Livre Noir*, I, Paris 1922, p. 326),

his attitude underwent a significant change, decidedly influenced by the surprising victories of the Balkan States. During the Bosnian crisis the French Government had declared to Petersburg that it would not allow itself to be dragged into war because of Russian interests in the Balkans. But now Poincaré notified his friend Isvolsky, who had become Russian Ambassador in Paris,

“that a territorial gain of Austria in the Balkans touches the general European balance of power and consequently the direct interests of France” (*Livre Noir*, I, p. 342).

Poincaré thereby fully realized,

“that in this way France could be involved in military action” (*Livre Noir*, I, p. 342).

Isvolsky was naturally delighted with this “entirely new standpoint” of France, which Poincaré repeatedly discussed.

¹ Lately doubts have turned up if the Treaty really was concluded.

Poincaré also emphatically assured the Russian Ambassador of the energetic support of the French Republic.

"In brief", Poincaré added, "this means that, if Russia wages war, France will also wage war, because we know that in this question Germany will back Austria" (*Livre Noir*, I, pp. 346, 348, 362).

Thus, Poincaré, in an aggressive sense, went beyond the letter of the Franco-Russian Alliance. In contrast, responsible persons in Petersburg declared,

"that even in the very improbable case of an Austrian attack on Serbia Russia would not march",

an attitude which greatly astonished Poincaré and other French Cabinet Ministers who had already occupied themselves with certain mobilization measures (*Livre Noir*, I, p. 369/70).

Isvolsky saw himself obliged to explain to his Government the remarkable change of mind of the Quai d'Orsay with regard to the Balkans.

"... lately I have not had to fight any more against the idea that a war could be imposed on France because of foreign interests, but rather against the apprehension that we might be too passive in a question regarding the position and the prestige of the entire Triple Entente" (*Livre Noir*, I, p. 372).

When Poincaré became President of the Republic in January 1913 he told Isvolsky that in his new capacity he would have "full power to influence directly the foreign policy of France".

Further, according to Poincaré it was

"of the highest importance for the French Government to be able in advance to take part in influencing public opinion as to a war which might arise in the matter of the Balkans" (*Livre Noir*, II, Paris 1923, pp. 14/5).

This was accomplished by the transfer of large sums from Russia for the purpose of bribing the French press. Poincaré and a French Minister took care that the money was properly distributed (revelations out of the Russian Archives in *L'Humanité*, Paris, January 1924).

In conformity with these documents the Russian Ambassador in London, in February 1913, came to the conclusion,

“that of all the Powers France is the only one which, not to say that it wishes war, would yet look upon it without great regret” (*Livre Noir*, II, pp. 303/4).¹

At this time Russia did not want war. She did not feel herself strong enough. But she consoled Serbia with hopes for the future. Foreign Minister Sasonov said to the Serbian Minister in Petersburg on December 27, 1912,

“that in view of our (Serbian) great successes he had confidence in our strength and believed that we would be able to deliver a shock to Austria”;

the Serbians should consider their present successes as a „temporary halting place“ because the future belonged to them (Bogitshevich, p. 99). Sasonov raised the same expectations on February 4 and April 29, 1913 (Bogitshevich, pp. 99/100).² And when war threatened to break out between the Balkan Allies and Bulgaria, Sasonov, on May 6, 1913, directed an urgent appeal to Belgrade:

“Serbia’s promised land is within the boundaries of present Austria-Hungary and not there, where she is now striving to, and where the Bulgars stand in her way. Under these conditions it is a life interest of Serbia . . . to prepare herself in tenacious and patient work sufficiently for the struggle which in future is unavoidable. Time works for Serbia and for the destruction of her enemies which already show clear signs of decay” (from the Russian Archives, cf. *German Whitebook*, June 1919, p. 99).

Austria-Hungary who felt herself seriously menaced by the Balkan Wars, repeatedly wanted to attack Serbia. Germany

¹ The authenticity of these documents from the Russian Archives has never been disputed by any authority. Both volumes of the *Livre Noir* contain mainly the secret correspondence of Isvolsky with the Russian Foreign Minister from 1911 to 1914 and are indispensable for a just opinion on the causes of the war.

² Dr. Bogitshevich is a former Serbian Diplomat. His documents disclose the Russo-Serb plans to wrest the Slav provinces from Austria; they are most important regarding the question of responsibility and their authenticity is beyond doubt.

energetically kept her back. Early in February 1913, von Moltke, Chief of Staff, wrote to Bethmann Hollweg, that according to him the Chancellor's chief task was "to prevent as far as possible Austrian follies". And on February 10, Bethmann Hollweg warned the Austrian Foreign Minister, that he considered a violent solution at this moment as "a mistake of immeasurable consequences" (unpublished German documents, Brandenburg, pp. 365/7).

The Belgian Minister in Berlin, Baron Beyens, on November 30, 1912, summarised his impressions in the following words:

"There is no doubt that the Emperor, the Chancellor, and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs are passionately pacifists" (*Belgian Documents* No. 96).

Since Italy also was decidedly opposed to Serbia establishing herself on the Adriatic Sea, and since Russia was not yet prepared for war, the Balkan War, especially the second one, amongst the Slav "Brothers", would again have given Germany a favourable opportunity to satisfy her alleged desires for world hegemony . . .

XIV. European Militarism

"... the idea that the people of Germany as a whole, or even in large part, were at that time (1912) bent on war is a legend of later origin . . ." (Dawson, II, p. 462).

"Russia, like Germany and France, had made feverish efforts since the Balkan wars to increase and improve her armaments; for it was in vain that Witte and Rosen¹ besought the Tsar and their colleagues in the Council of the Empire to drop the forward policy in the Balkans which was leading straight to war" (Gooch, *History*, p. 522).

The enormous strengthening of Serbia and the growing leaning of Roumania toward the Triple Entente, though she was bound by treaty to the Triple Alliance, had affected the political and strategic position of the Central Powers very much to the latter's disadvantage. Therefore Germany greatly increased

¹ Russian statesmen. — Lutz.

her army in 1913. On January 1, 1914, Mr. Lloyd George wrote in the *Daily Chronicle*:

"The German Army is vital, not merely to the existence of the German Empire, but to the very life and independence of the nation itself, surrounded as Germany is by other nations, each of which possesses armies about as powerful as her own."

Almost simultaneously with the German army-bill France returned to the Three Years' Conscription Law and maintained it at the wish of Russia despite the violent opposition of the French Left (Beazley, p. 278). Based on the best British and foreign authorities E. D. Morel has thoroughly investigated the important question of armaments in the pamphlet *Military Preparations for the Great War* (London 1922). The result is: In the decade 1905—1914 France and Russia spent £ 230 millions more for their Army and Navy than Germany and Austria-Hungary (pp. 16—18); the Central Powers (without Italy) in 1914 had a peace strength of 1,239,000 men, Russia-France of 2,239,000 in summer, and of 2,639,000 in winter; the war strength of the Central Powers then was 3,358,000 men, but that of Russia-France 5,070,000! (p. 20). Further, upon the outbreak of war Germany had a stock of 970 millions of cartridges for the infantry and 5,2 millions of rounds for the field artillery, whereas France had 1310 and 5,68 millions respectively (pp. 25/6). It is just as noteworthy that, as the French General Buat establishes (*L'Armée allemande pendant la guerre de 1914—1918*, Paris),

"France alone at the beginning of the war was at least equal in strength to, if not stronger than, her mighty opponent as regards the larger units" (quoted by Morel, p. 21).

Indeed, until 1913 Germany had called up only 55 per cent. of her available recruits, and after the army law of 1913 68 per cent., while in France the proportion was 75 per cent. In this manner France was able to maintain an army about as large as that of Germany, which in 1914 had around 25 millions more

inhabitants than France! General Buat points out that if Germany had made the same pre-war effort as France she could have sent to the front at the outbreak of the war another 600,000 men! (Morel, p. 22).

Russia armed most assiduously of all.

No well-informed German will deny that German "militarism" had a special character of its own as appeared for instance in the "Zabern Affair". However, the Zabern case was condemned in the Diet by 293 votes to only 54, i. e. by the vast majority of the German people (Dawson, II, p. 349). General von Bernhardt's book *Germany and The Next War* was misused by the *Entente* for the sake of propaganda. *I have ascertained from the publisher that from 1912 to the end of 1914 only 7000 copies of the German edition were sold.* Indeed, at the outbreak of the war Bernhardt was hardly known in Germany.

On the other hand of the well known books of the French Staff Officer Arthur Boucher the following number of copies were sold: *La France Victorieuse dans la Guerre de Demain* (Victorious France in the War of To-Morrow) after one month (1911) 16,000, until 1914 even 22,000 copies; *L'Offensive contre l'Allemagne* (The Offensive against Germany) 13,000 copies in the first year (1912).

The Belgian Minister in Paris was greatly worried about the frame of mind of the French capital. On March 3, 1913 he reported:

"Everybody you meet tells you that an early war with Germany is certain and inevitable,"

and on May 8, 1914:

"One of the most dangerous features of the actual situation is France's return to the Three Years' Law. It has been frivolously imposed upon the country by the military party, and is more than she can bear. In less than two years from now they will either have to abandon it or go to war" (*Belgian Documents*, No. 101, 115).

XV. The "Encirclement" of Germany

"Germany and Austria are only dangerous to the peace of the world so long as they are penned up within their present limits" (Sir Harry Johnston, *Common Sense in Foreign Policy*, London 1913, p. 61).

"It is, however, true that every time the German Government strove to advance its interests in regions in which other Powers were interested, it found itself face to face, not with one Power, but with a group of powers" (the Russian Ambassador in London in February 1912, *Siebert-documents*, p. 618).

Sir Edward Grey clearly saw, that the isolation of Germany would involve "an actual danger to the cause of peace", and he constantly denied that he wished to isolate Germany (*Siebert-documents*, p. 618). I am convinced that Sir Edward Grey himself did not work for war. But he was filled with an invincible distrust of Germany, and that affected his judgement. Moreover, he did not take into account how much his steady support of France and Russia must strengthen the war parties in those countries.

In 1912 attempts were made for an Anglo-German *rapprochement*. In the course of the negotiations the British Cabinet hesitated whether it should accept a certain neutrality proposal of Germany or not. Poincaré was informed, and he at once threatened Britain with a rupture of the *Entente*. So the British Cabinet rejected the German proposal "which provoked vivid annoyance in Berlin" (Poincaré to Isvolsky, *Livre Noir*, I, pp. 365/6). According to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin the German Government "passionately desired" a *rapprochement* with England (*Siebert-documents*, p. 644).

At the instigation of Poincaré, Grey and Cambon exchanged the wellknown letters of November 1912 which in theory, but not in reality, left the hands of Great Britain free (Gooch, *History*, pp. 498/9; Dawson, II, p. 456; Earl Loreburn, *How The War Came*, London 1919). The insurance system of the *Entente* was continually extended. Finally, in the spring of 1914, Anglo-Russian negotiations began concerning a naval

Convention. Germany learned of them, and it is not surprising that all these activities alarmed her rulers.

On February 8, 1912, the Russian Ambassador in London wrote:

“England finds herself at the head of an immense colonial empire . . . is satiated with land . . . Germany’s position is to a certain degree the reverse to that of England . . . Not without ambition to increase her colonial possessions, Germany, . . . follows rather the road of peaceful penetration by confining herself principally to vast undertakings, in which, however, she always meets the opposition of England . . . To me the most striking proof of this seems to be the Bagdad railway” (*Siebert-documents*, p. 620).

This commercial opposition, which had also showed itself in Morocco and Persia, naturally aroused bitter feelings in Germany and must be regarded as one of the causes of the war. Only from 1913 onward did Sir Edward Grey make Germany liberal concessions in regard to Asia-Minor and the Portuguese Colonies.

XVI. A. French *Carte Blanche*—Russia resolves to conquer the Dardanelles—War Aims

“The Japanese military mission . . . was struck by the anti-German feelings, which to-day animates the Russian officers. In the regimental messes the Japanese officers heard open talk of an early war against Austria-Hungary and Germany. One said the army was ready to take the field, and the moment was just as auspicious for the Russians as for their allies, the French” (Belgian report of April 1914, *Zur Europäischen Politik*, vol. IV, No. 88).

The reorganisation of the Turkish Navy had been entrusted to a British Admiral. Russia violently opposed a similar rôle for the German General Liman von Sanders in connection with the Turkish Army. In January 1914 a Council of Ministers debated the matter in Petersburg. There Sazonov told his colleagues:

„As to France, the Russian Government can count upon an active support to all lengths. Mr. Delcassé (French Ambassador) . . . in the

name of the French Foreign Minister has assured us that France would go as far as Russia desires" (Documents from the Russian Archives, used in the article *Drei Konferenzen* by Professor M. Pokrovski, Petrograd, German translation, Berlin 1920, p. 39).

That was a French *carte-blanche* for war (cf. *Livre Noir*, II, pp. 223, 230; *Siebert-documents*, p. 704). But England's aloof attitude discouraged Petersburg. Moreover, Germany gave in. Both the Russian War Minister and the Chief of Staff declared at that time in the council

"categorically Russia's full preparedness for a duel with Germany, not to mention one with Austria" (Pokrovski, p. 42).

In February 1914 another Conference took place in Petersburg. It resolved to carry out the necessary preparations for a conquest of the Dardanelles. The Ministers knew,

"that the fight for Constantinople was hardly possible without a general war."

Sasonov reckoned with the active help of Serbia, whereupon the Chief of Staff pointed out

"the great importance of a Serbian attack on Austria-Hungary for us (Russia)", (Pokrovski, pp. 46—67).

In the same month the Tsar said to the Serbian Prime Minister Pasitch after a long audience:

"For Serbia we shall do everything, greet the King for me and tell him: For Serbia we shall do all" (Bogitshevich, p. 134).

About the same time Delcassé repeatedly talked with Sasonov over the war aims of France which at that time consisted chiefly in the reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine (Isvolsky to Sasonov on October 13, 1914, document No. 347, *Berliner Tageblatt* of December 28, 1922, No. 589).

In Berlin the mood was different. The Russian Ambassador there reported on March 12, 1914:

"According to wholly confidential reports reaching me, the growing military strength of Russia is causing ever more serious anxiety at Berlin . . . it is my conviction that between all the lines printed about

Russo-German relations in the German newspapers of late one may always read fear of Russia. In conclusion, let me express the hope, that they are not in error about this at Berlin, and that we are actually taking all measures for strengthening our military power — which must compel Germany to hesitate before no measures so as to bring her preparedness for war to the highest pitch" (*Siebert-documents*, p. 711).

A month later the same Ambassador reported that "the military men and the Prussian Junkers" on account of their fear of Russia entertained the idea of a preventive war; but the Ambassador confirmed his opinion that

"the German Government prefers to try all peaceful means towards reconciliation before taking any decisive step" (*Siebert-documents*, p. 712).

It is certain that at that time there were Chauvinists and war-mongers in Berlin just as everywhere else. I have already given some examples. But the main question to ask ourselves is: "Did Germany have aims which could only be realized by a general war?" The German Archives which are open to everyone negative this question and negative the intention of a will for war.

On the other hand, the aim of France for the re-conquest of Alsace-Lorraine, the aim of Russia for the conquest of the Dardanelles, and the aim of Serbia for aggrandizement at the expense of Austria-Hungary—these aims could only materialize through a European War.

But the masses of the people of the rival "groups" into which Europe was divided did not desire a war.

XVII. The Outbreak of the World War

"France and Russia play at this moment really a very dangerous game. They push each other on the path of unlimited armaments, and devote themselves — especially Russia — to a bluff which might have the most sinister consequences" (Belgian report from Paris of June 24, 1914, *Zur Europäischen Politik*, vol. IV, No. 96).

Four days after this despatch was sent off, on June 28, 1914, the Austrian heir to the throne and his Consort were murdered at Sarajevo by young Bosniaks. The Austrian Government soon discovered that a Serbian Major had prepared the plot in Belgrade and that Serbian frontier officials were implicated. Since then it has come to light that the Chief of the Information Bureau in the Serbian General Staff, Colonel Dimitrijevitich, was the real organizer of the crime (cf. Stanoje Stanojevitch, *Die Ermordung des Erzherzogs Franz Ferdinand*, German translation, Frankfurt a. M. 1923, pp. 43 to 56.—Stanojevitch is Professor of history at the university of Belgrade). This disclosure shows how comprehensible was the demand of Vienna that Austrian officials should take part in the investigations on Serbian soil. Even without any knowledge of this fact the English *White Paper on the European Crisis*, 1914, stated (p. V):

“Austria was under provocation. She had to complain of a dangerous popular movement against her government”.

To-day we know that two Serbian officers organized the assassination. What would the English have done in a similar position as that in which Austria was placed?

The history of the “13 days” cannot be related here. They were only the culmination of a development of many years. It suffices to quote the result of Dr. G. P. Gooch’s investigation regarding those critical days in his excellent *History of Modern Europe* (pp. 534—559):

“Vienna was no more the tool of Berlin in 1914 than in 1908 . . . The German Government had rashly encouraged Berchtold (Austrian Foreign Minister) to set the stone rolling . . . but after the Serbian reply they attempted to apply the brake to the Austrian chariot . . . The Tsar appeared to the German Ambassador hardly to realize the significance of what he had done (general mobilization) . . . but his Foreign Secretary and War Minister could be under no such delusion . . . the irrevocable step was taken. Moreover, it was understood between

the French and Russian experts that mobilization was equivalent to a declaration of war. The provocation involved in the attack on Serbia was grievous . . . and the guilt of the Austrian ultimatum was beyond comparison greater than the guilt of the Russian mobilization, because it was first in time and invited the response which it received¹. The world-war was nevertheless precipitated by the action of Russia at a moment when conversations between Vienna and Petrograd were being resumed, when Bethmann Hollweg was at length endeavouring to restrain his ally, and when the Tsar and the Kaiser were in telegraphic communication . . . While Sir Edward Grey had been gallantly struggling to build a bridge between Vienna and Petrograd, the French Government played a strangely passive part throughout the crisis . . . Though the conduct of each of the belligerents appeared devilish to its enemies, yet in every case it was precisely what might have been expected . . . It was . . . natural that Austria should defend herself against the openly proclaimed ambition to rob her of provinces which she had held for centuries . . . The ultimatum to Serbia was a gambler's throw; but to the statesmen of Vienna and Budapest it appeared to offer the best chance of escape from a terrible danger which was certain to increase and which challenged the existence of Austria as a Great Power. The conduct of Germany was no less short-sighted, yet no less intelligible . . . If Austria ceased to be a Great Power through the loss of her southern provinces, Germany would stand alone in Europe, wedged in between a hostile Russia and a France bent on revenge . . . The main cause of the conflict lay in the Near East, and its authors were Germany and Austria on the one side, Russia and Serbia on the other . . . The violation of Belgian neutrality . . . was the occasion rather than the cause of our entry into the war . . . we had departed from our traditional policy of isolation, and become entangled in the quarrels and ambitions of our friends . . . Sir Edward's assurance on August 3 that our hands were free was correct in form but inaccurate in substance, and his whole speech breathed the conviction that we should be disgraced if we left France in the lurch . . . The root of the evil lay in the division of Europe into two armed camps, which dated from 1871, and the conflict was the offspring of fear no less than of ambition. The Old World had degenerated into a powder magazine, in which the dropping of a lighted match, whether by accident or design, was almost certain to produce a conflagration . . . It is a mistake to imagine that the conflict of 1914 took Europe unawares, for the

¹ To this one might object that the ultimatum did not necessarily mean a general war but that the Russian mobilization did; and it should further be considered that Russia herself was in no danger whatever. Numbers of non-German authorities hold the view that it was the Russian general mobilization which loosed the World War.

statesmen and soldiers had been expecting it and preparing for it for many years. It is also a mistake to attribute exceptional wickedness to the Governments who, in the words of Lloyd George, stumbled and staggered into war. Blind to danger and deaf to advice as were the civilian leaders of the three despotic empires, not one of them, when it came to the point, desired to set the world alight."

XVIII. For the Sake of Peace

"... the past governs the present and the future... Upon the ceaseless pursuit of truth in this matter the salvation of mankind ultimately rests" (Morel, *Pre-War Diplomacy*, p. 7).

"... do we not at length perceive that the outrage of the 'Peace' is the inevitable sequel of the outrage of the fraud? ... If our late enemies be ... neither plotters nor instigators of the war, sharing responsibility for it, assuredly, through their late rulers, but perhaps to a less extent than the late rulers of Russia or even those of France ... — then who will deny that our national honour is at stake in this great debate?" (Morel, *The Poison that Destroys*, pp. 21/2).

"... in nothing I have ever said or written on this subject have I sought to clear Germany of a share of responsibility for the war. What I have done has been to demonstrate that her share was a share only ... No one who is acquainted with recent evidence ... can now contend that the Great War was deliberately planned by Germany. Much will be found in that evidence to prove that it was deliberately planned by the Russian Tsardom" (Morel, *Military Preparations for the Great War*, p. 4).

At Versailles, Germany has been branded and condemned as solely responsible for "the greatest crime against humanity". She was given no opportunity to defend herself. Since then Germany has been treated as a nation of criminals. This has carried a mass of poison into the stream of international life which must tend to destroy generations yet unborn unless it can be quickly and thoroughly eradicated. It is a question of the greatest moral and ethical importance. No people marked as a nation of criminals can live in peace with its neighbours when it knows that the accusation is false. High ideals, such as suffering humanity yearns for in a true League of Nations with members possessing equal rights, are compromised perhaps irremediably.

Can any one who has done me the honour of perusing these pages, and who has noted the numerous quotations therein given from distinguished British writers and historians, still believe in Germany's sole responsibility for the war?

My conclusions are the conclusions of Englishmen who have themselves made a special study of the documentary evidence now available!

Must Germans then be branded for ever before posterity for a crime not imputable to them?

Their share, or, rather, the share of their late Government, in the follies, the mistakes, the opposing ambitions which led to the war, they fully admit.

But beyond that no Germans who have any notion of national honour can, or will go.

The German people do not ask for mercy.

They ask for Justice.

They are convinced of the ingrained sense of British fair play.

It is to this sense they appeal.

They ask of the British nation that it will do its part in ridding the German nation of the unmerited curse which bows it down.

In so doing we Germans believe that we are appealing for the purification of the international atmosphere on behalf of the whole of Humanity.

“... while this legend (of Germany's sole culpability) continues to be treated by the Governments (or their successors)¹ victorious in the Great War, as '*Chose jugée*' ... as, in fact, the justification—*and the only justification*—for the Versailles Treaty ... **the world will not know peace**” (Morel, *Military Preparations for the Great War*, p. 4).

¹ Morel's brackets, — Men like C. R. Buxton and J. A. Hobson also share the views of Morel. See above all Hobson's article *The New Scheme for Reparations in Foreign Affairs* for May 1924.


To the British Historians

"For the Allies German responsibility for the war is fundamental. It is the basis upon which the structure of the Treaty of Versailles has been erected..." (Prime Minister Lloyd George at the London Conference on March 3, 1921).

The preceding historical survey, as has been stated on page 31, does not profess to be exhaustive. About the policy of the Powers concerned there remains more to be said, and as a matter of course not all of the signatories can be in complete accord with each detail of Lutz' presentation. Opinions must differ somewhat about such an eventful period as that from 1870 to 1914, especially as England and France have not yet opened their archives in the same way as Germany, and to some extent Russia and Austria, have done.

But we are unanimous in the positive repudiation of the quite unjustified assertion that Germany was alone responsible for the causes and for the outbreak of the Great War. Historical evidence now available is amply sufficient to demonstrate that the charges made at Versailles are far from being true.

We, the undersigned, together with other German historians, and experts in the war guilt question, are ready at any time to discuss with British and other historians the genesis of the World War. We should expect good results from a public discussion the conclusions of which ought to be published in the world's press.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Dr. Bergstrüper". The signature is written in a cursive style with a horizontal line underneath the name.

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¹ For names and descriptions of the signers see pp. 76—78.

Randubur

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Dr. J. Dirr. Helmolt.

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Martin Kolbman

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Dr. Robert Hoeniger

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Prof. Dr. Stäcker

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Hermann Lutz

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Dr. Carl Schubert

9

Arnold Oskar Meyer

10

Hermann Oucken

11

Ludde

12¹

Dr. Paul Rofberg.

13

V. Sjöberg Schulze Gavernitz

14

15

Thomasson

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¹ It would be a pleasure to me to discuss the question of responsibility for the war with a group of unbiased Englishmen. As I could not repress certain objections to the wording of the *Appeal*, I take the liberty to refer to my pamphlet *Die Schuldfrage* (The War Guilt Question), concerning the preliminary conditions which are necessary, if the discussion is to have prospect of success.

Dr. H. Zorn

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Jur. H. Zorn.

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Veit Valentini

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Prof. Zorn.

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¹ In regard to the treatise of Hermann Lutz, Professor Dr. Zorn wishes to point out especially, that Germany, at the first Hague Conference, expressed her will to peace emphatically through the decision of the Emperor to accept the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Names and Descriptions of the Signers

1. Dr. Ludwig Bergsträsser, Professor of History at the Technical University of Berlin; Chief Recorder at the German Federal Archives; Author of *Die Diplomatischen Kämpfe vor Kriegsausbruch* (The Diplomatic Struggle before the Outbreak of the War), *Geschichte der Politischen Parteien in Deutschland* (History of the Political Parties in Germany) etc.; Member of the Reichstag, Democrat.
2. Dr. Erich Brandenburg, Professor of Modern History at the University of Leipzig; Author of *Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege* (From Bismarck to the World War).
3. Dr. P. Dirr, Director of the City Archives of Munich; Editor of *Bayerische Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch* (Bavarian Documents concerning the Outbreak of the War; 2nd ed. 1924), and Author of other writings on the War Guilt Question; Member of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Party, District of Bavaria.
4. Professor Dr. Hans F. Helmolt, Berlin; Historian and Publicist; Author of *Kautsky der Historiker* (Kautsky the Historian, 1920), *Von Caprivi bis Versailles. Ein Leitfadens in der Schuldfrage* (From Caprivi to Versailles. A Manual of the War Guilt Question, 1923) and other books; Partisan of the German National People's Party.
5. Dr. Martin Hohobhm, Assistant Professor of Medieval and Modern History at the University of Berlin; Recorder at the German Federal Archives; Author of the official Memoir *Die alldeutsche Bewegung, eine politische Schuld und Gefahr*, presented to the Imperial Chancellor in March 1916; in Collaboration with Paul Rohrbach and Joachim Kühn Author of *Chauvinismus und Weltkrieg*, vol. II: *Die Alldeutschen* (The German Jingoists); Member of the Democratic Party.
6. Dr. Robert Hoeniger, Hon. Professor at the University of Berlin; Expert of the Parliamentary Investigating Committee of the Reichstag regarding the War; Author of *Russlands Vorbereitung zum Weltkrieg* (Russia's Preparation for the World War).
7. Professor Dr. E. Jäckh, Berlin; President of the Executive Committee of the German League of Nations' Union; Expert of the Parliamentary Investigating Committee of the Reichstag regarding the War.
8. Hermann Lutz, Munich; Expert of the Parliamentary Investigating Committee of the Reichstag regarding the War; Member of the Democratic Party.

9. Dr. Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, University of Hamburg; Principal of the German Institute of International Affairs; Editor of the Monthly *Europäische Gespräche*; Co-Editor of the German Official Documents *Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1870—1914*.
10. Dr. Arnold Oskar Meyer, Professor in ord. of Modern and Medieval History at the University of Göttingen; Member of the German National People's Party.
11. Hermann Oncken, Professor in ord. of Modern History at the University of Munich.
12. Professor Dr. Ludwig Quidde, Munich; Historian; President of the *Deutsche Friedenskartell* (Union of 22 Peace Organisations) and of the Executive Committee of the German Peace Society; Vice-President of the International Union of Peace Societies; Member of the Executive Committee of the German Democratic Party.
13. Dr. Paul Rohrbach, Berlin.
14. Dr. Walther Schücking, Professor of Law in Berlin; Member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague; President of the German Group of the Interparliamentary Union; Co-Editor of *Die Deutschen Dokumente zum Kriegeausbruch* (The German Documents regarding the Outbreak of the War); Member of the Reichstag, Democrat.
15. Dr. G. von Schulze Gävernitz, Professor of Political Economy at the University of Friburg (Baden); for many years Member of the Reichstag; Writer on the economic and social conditions of England and Russia, and on German banking affairs.
16. Colonel Bernhard Schwertfeger, retired, Pymont; Editor of the Belgian Documents *Zur Europäischen Politik* (Concerning European Politics); Author of *Der Fehlspruch von Versailles* etc.; Expert of the Parliamentary Investigating Committee of the Reichstag regarding the War.
17. Dr. Friedrich Thimme, Berlin; Director of the Library of the Prussian Diet; Co-Editor of the German Official Documents *Die Große Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1870—1914*.
18. Dr. phil., Dr. jur. h. c. Ferdinand Tönnies, Professor of Political Science at the University of Kiel; Philosopher and Sociologist; Author of *Die Schuldfrage* (The War Guilt Question), *Der Zarismus und seine Bundesgenossen 1914* (Tsarism and its Allies in 1914) etc.
19. Dr. Veit Valentin, Berlin; form. Professor of History at the University of Friburg (Baden), lecturing since 1918 at the Commer-

cial Academy of Berlin; Recorder at the German Federal Archives; Author of *Deutschlands Außenpolitik 1890—1918* (Germany's Foreign Policy 1890—1918) etc.; Member of the Democratic Party.

20. Dr. jur. et rer. pol. Philipp Zorn, Professor of Constitutional and International Law at the University of Bonn; King's Privy Counsel; German Delegate at both the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907; Member of the German National People's Party.

Further copies of the "Appeal" may be had on application to Hermann Lutz, 34, Elisabethstraße, Munich (Bavaria).

